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Rcnarks of Sena to r Mike Mansfield

·-t..J ~ ;?~t,~~ ~ ~·

~cuJ:i DEFENSE Al\I J:

sfcuRITY

With the truce in Ko r ea and the inconcbsive reoults of the Berlin
Conference, another chapter in the boo!t of history must be considered .

The

future of the United States of America dependo on the maintenance of a sound military policy, keyed to C:1e d·;.ngers of the atomic age and at the san.e time tied to
the economic and

poli~:.cal

harnework of ou:: ca;;>ita.Hstic syotcn1 .

There is no

chec:.p, no easy nor su:re sobtion to the difficdties which confront us in t!1is day
and age.

There is ::o

by its very
clearer

r; :r.t;~e

dest::-uct~•.r e ness

thinkin~,

pos::.L::le

W.:!~.pcn

preve"'lt them.

fG:.t.i'1g up to

rec:.lit~es

whid1 v:ill automatically win wars or

The abe in whkh we live calls for

and sound decisions .

This period calls for

steadine<Js :no·:!' !o1·:;;:;n r·~licy ?r:<! co·~~:nui~y ~n o~'.i..' miHta.::-y stt·cngth.
in which'""':: UVF.
a peace£a:
on that

pc:~

a~d ::;e;:ul ·~

£o1· ·. s tr..:

.~::>sdb~1.ity

The age

that w::t:r·o may be recurrent and until

·.,.;orl:i is achieved, we must, in my opinion , always operate

assump~:on.

I real.:.::.;:

fl~~ l ·.:e:~ ~·

life can be ac:.icved

'l.t

~~·e id~;:.:i sts

:'.>~all p:;op~e ~o

I wiGh that I could hold to

t: ~s

idec>.l.

::.mor.g

the end t1.a t

\..~

w~:·s

thi·.k that a better way of
will be a'"'andoned forever .

I p::c:.y that it can come true but as a matte r

of practical ner.~.:ssi -~·. 1 c:.rn a~ra5~ that i.vng- sought· for day is b~yond the period
of our

immcd~a~e hi£"~::>ric<:~l

.futur-e.

longer afford to keep our tl\cH'd --

!n i.he
tha~

if; ,

w~''1

Ot.. :•

our :respon:;ibilities, we can no

c!efe!.ses - - cown.

As the leading

nation among the fr ac coun:::-ies of the world, we mu•:;t assume the burden of
leadership if the peoples in the arc;:. arc to r<>tain any degree of the freedom
which they now enjoy .

We

c~nnot

afford ups and downs in eithe:: our military or
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foreign policy and we should recognize the fact these freedoms which we enjoy
were paid for with our blood and our treasure.

We must r ealize further that if

we are to retain these freedoms, which too many of us accept complacently, that
we must be prepared to pay and i! need be, to fight for their retention.
In the present world there are two great powers behind which, to a
greater or lesser degree, the rest of the world is aligned.

Those powers as the

world well knows are the United States of America and the Union of the Soviet
SociaHs~

Republic.

The tactical changes in Russian policy do not mean that we

can afford to shore up our defenses, bring the boys home and lapse into a period
which used to be called "normalcy".
The Soviet's idea to bring Arne rica to its knees is two-fold; one, to
weaken our economy to such an extent that we will have a depression at home.
Two, to cause a split between our allies and ourselves,

Honeyed words by the

Soviets should not lull us into a sense of false security because unless these words
are transformed into deeds, and until these deeds prove what they mean, there
can be no let - up in the deep seated friction which exists between the free and
slave world .

Americans would be foolish to think that the skies above and the

oceans on both sides furnish us with a really protective barrier.

We know that

we are very vulnerable and becoming more so each day as space - devouring,
ocean-spanning aircraft and missiles, submarines that can cross the oceans subme:-ged and atomic weapons are developed .

The fact that other frontiers are

vulnerable does not mean any less security for the vulnerability of our own outer
life lines.

The possibility of a seriously crippling attack against the shores of
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the United States is something we must remember at all times and on that basis
we must do all we can to bring about, if possible, awareness of the danger such
an attack might inflate.
According to our best informe<i scientists, we have about a three-year
lead in the ato mic arms race in relation to the
been three atomic detonations in Russia.

So vi ~ t

Union.

We know there have

We know that the United States has

detonated at least 44 A-weapons of all types from city-busters to atomic shells
fired by cannon.

In November, 1952 for the first time a hydrogen device blew an

istc.nd off the map of the Pacific, created a tremendous crater in the bottom of
the ocean of Sllfficient capacity to comfortably accommodate 14 Pentagon buildings,
and released tl1e equivalent in power of more than five million tons of TNT as
compared to the 15, 000 - 20, 000-ton bomb of Hiroshima and the 20, 000-ton bomb
of Nagasaki.

In World War II Ameri<:an Air Force planes all over the world

dropped only two million tons of bombs; today 100 B-50 airplanes with one
Nagasaki type bomb each would equal that amount.

In other words, the hydrogen

bomb is to the atomic bomb as the atomic bomb is to TNT.

We are now definitely

in the hydrogen age and all the armed services of the United States are now
beginning to receive production versions of guided missiles and are also continuing to develop still further the terrible German nerve gases, developed in World
War 11, to even more toxic gases.

This technological revolution in weapons has

decre;:tsed, not inc:t"eased, our security and this factor shodd be fully unC.erstood
by all of us.

In practically every field of tech.1ological research in the weapons

of d e st2'uction, we mu·st assume, and I thin!< rightly so, that the Soviet Union is
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moving along parallel paths.

The Soviet Union today has, it has been estimated,

a stockpile of between 100-175 atomic weapons.

In the opinion of certain high

ranking officials of the United States Air Force, she w::.ll have enough atomic
weapons by mid - 1954 to sustain an atomic offensive against the United States and
our allies and the planes to carry the bombs.

Our atomic advan!age in quantity

and qua!ity of weapons will not be of much comfort to us if and when such a time
comes, but neither will it be too much of an advantc.ge to an aggressor because
the aggressor knows that the retaliation

·.<~ill

be terrible and in

k~nd.

In the matter of hyC.rogen bombs, we might just z.s well face up to the

fact that the Russians have their scientists working on the problem and that its
development will be somewhat parallel to ours .

In addition, it is reasonable to

assume that both the Soviet Union and the free world are working on what is known
as the "cobalt" bomb.

This advance over the hydrogen missile could be made by

"seeding" atom and hydrogen bombs with cobalt.

I understand the resulting

radiation would be so deadly that it would destroy friend and foe alike.
see therefore that Russia in the final analysis is not
getting stronger all the time .
tl1ei:- st.:ategy.

get~ing

V'e can

weaker but is, in fact,

Their tactics ..1ay be changed temporarily but not

Their ultimate goal is still the same, sec•uity for the Soviet

Union and _world conquest.

These two objectives can and should be viewed as

mutually supporting and identical.
Turning to the economy of our country we can see that even here we are
entering a period of danger.

In the past few years the United St=-.tes has changed

from "!1.ave" to a "have not" nation.

For the first time in our history, we are

- 5 importing more than 50o/o of our raw materi,;.ls from sources outside of our own
frontiers.

This fact should be borne in mind for a better understanding of the

foreign policy of the United States and which should bring h ome to all of us the
continuing need which we will have on other nations as sources of supply for
these raw strategic materials.

The present administration has, and I believe

rightly, abandoned the "crisis year" philosophy of the previous administration
and prepared, instead, not for any definite date of danger but for an indefinite
continuation of danger.
Because of the reasons enumerated, we should recognize that we face
far greater difficulties in the future than we have in the past.
today and that strength must be maintained.

We have strength

We are fa!" better prepared at this

moment than we were prio r to any of the wars in which this country has been
engaged.

O ur Navy is the strongest in the world. !t is large r than all the rest

of the world's fleets put together even though 50 of its ships are to be put in
mothballs under the "new look".

We are operating a total of 25-30 aircraft

carriers of all types and we maintain - for the time being at least - an
amphibious lift in commission for two divisions.
against any threat by submarine.

We arc fairly well-prepared

Of the some 400 Soviet submarines possibly

ten arc of the modern snorkel l ong -range type; another 75-100 are conventional
ocean - going types; all the re st are small coastal submarines or old mediumrange vessels.

The United States has m o re long-range ocean-going submarines

than the Russians and our defenses against snbmarinc attacks are by no means
weak.

- 6 On the question of air power, we are not weaker in number though we
may be behind tempora:-ily in the number of modern tactical types.

The Navy

and the Marine Corps has an inventory of about 13, OvO planes of all military
types (including t::ainers); the Air Force has about 21, 000 which, under fiscal
1955 budget plans will be increased to 22 , 000 by mid-!955 .

We are stronger

than the Soviet Union in long-range land-based bombers and in naval plar.es both
car:-ier-based and patrol-type.

The Soviets have greater strength than we do in

land- based tactical types for support of ground armies, intcrcepti.on, and dayfighter missions.
The Air Force has activated more than 100 groups -- numbering from
30 to 75 planes each -- but probably no more than 85 of these groups are fully
ope:-ation:'ll at this time .

Our air power is in transition from propeller-driven,

slow - speed types to jet - powered transonic and supcrsor.ic types with only onefot:.rth of current Air Force flying time in jets.

In the latter field the Russians

appear at the momet'lt to be at least equal to, possibly superior to us.
The aircraft production of the two counti·ics is probably about the same
with the yearly outcome averaging between 12, 000 - 14, 000 military types.

One

difference though, and it is an important one, is that we arc producing more
planes in terms of air frame weight which means more of our outp:.1t rep:::esents
heavy complicated jet bombers.

Our greatest apparent disadvantage is on land.

The Marines have 3 divisions and the Army mair.tains 20 divisions plus 18 regi mental combat teams.

Of the Army divisions, six - with two being recalled

and one Marine division are in Korea; two , plus one Marine division , are in
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Japan; five in Europe; seven in the United States -- plus numerous regimental
combat teams and other smaller units here and abroad.

Cf the seven divisions

in the United States, six are weak -- below strength -- and none ready for combat
except the 82d Airborne Division.
The Russian'S on the other hand maintain a

b~sic

divisions though most of them are not at full strength.

framewor!< of 175

On the basis of combat

effectiveness, which includes mobility, fire power, etc., it is estimated that the
175 Russian divisions wodd approximately equal no more than 70 - 90 Americantype divisions.

The Soviet 1 s advantage of land power is very great, particularly

since the Rusaians could mobilize from 100 - 300 additional divisions in 90 cays,
whereas the United States r ese rve strength is in no sense organized, trained, or
equipped f,n c omba t without a long preparatory period after war starta.

Further-

more , although the str ength of the Soviet Army is practically the same as it was
at the end of Wo rld War II -- 175 divisions, numbering approximately 4 million
-- the fact is that almost all the Soviet divisions have been thoroughly modernized,
mechanized and brought up to date.

Cn the basis of what I have said, it is

appa!'ent that at the moment the Soviet UnioP has a greater advantage on land.
This, therefore, must be compensated for by a continuing American advantage
in the ai::- and at sea -- an

adv~ntage

which we hold today and wHch we m•.1st, in

my opinion, accelerate to a greater Jegree in the air.

Cur air strength is not

sufficient to win air supe riority over Western Europe or Northeast Asia.

We

are fortunate though in having s ome highly inJustrialized nations among our
allies in NATO, allies actually of potential strength in air power whe r eas in
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contrast , the captive countri<-s behind the Iron Curtain are chiefly dependent on
Soviet factories for their aircraft and equipment.

British desinn is abreast, or,

in some respects, ahead of the world, partict:larly in fighter types and .in meuium
or short- range jet bombers.

Though British air power is weak qua:1titatively

toc,.y and dependent chiefly upon U.S. F-86 jet ficrhtcrs and U.S. B-29 bombers ,
the future qualitative picture is bright.
must be added the strength of NATO .

Thus to ou.c

0\'10

strength in Europe

Despite what some people in this country

say, NATO is a great asset to the free world and the industrial output of Western
Europe , particularly, that of the Ruhr is
fleets and air
taken lighlly .

for~cs

tremcndo~.:.sly

important.

The divisions,

of the thirteen cour.tries in the NATO alliance, are not to be

Excli!Sive of five United States divisions, the original NA TC today

can put into the field 49 divisions in Western Europe plus 10 small ones in Greece;
22 large ones in Turkey and 33 in Yugoslavia.

This compares favorably with

eastern European satellite strength of approximately 80 divisions .

Our allies

also ope::ate over 4, 000 aircraft and more than 1, 000 antisubmarine and coastal
naval vessels .

In cont r ast in the Pacific there are now 20 South I<orean divisions .

There are now the beginning of six armed divisions in Japan; Chiang Kai - shek has
21 divisions on Formosa and in Indo - China the French have- the eqdvalent to ten
divisions and in Malaya the British have 2 .. 3.

There are other units all over

Asia and the Pacific but even here the back-bone of strength is America .
othe::- hand, the Chinese Communist Army is estimated at 4 millio:1.

Cn the

In addit:on

in other Asiatic countries there are f::.rther forces of guerrillas who at·e supported
and kept in the fight by supplies from Soviet Russia and Eastern Euro?C.

- 9 This, then, is where we stand today -- considerably better off, in a
military sense, than where we stood two and a half years ago. but by no means
secure.

In some ways we have gained by time; in some ways we have lost.

We

arc stronger in conventional arms vis-a-vis Soviet P.ussia than we were, and we
have probably gained relatively in atomic w apons. t!'lough this relative gain
cannot continue.
Western Europe is no longe:::- defenseless; the days of r. Russian
blitzkrieg and pushover are gone .
in Europe.

Yugoslavia has th:-own her lot in with the West

Our strength is now sufficier.t to force Russian re-enforcement and

thus to give us warning of any attack.
VIe are no longer in the dire danger in Korea that we were in 1950; and
the French -- faced in 1950 with the loss of the whole Red River valley in Indo China -- certainly are hetter off today, l>aving gained some ad•tantages in the war
of attrition in the past two years.

In the Philippines, Malaya, and Burma , the

Communist armed struggle has definitely lost st£"ength .
Cur :-eady military strength is considerable, and our trel'l"endous
military potential can be far more quickly realized than two years ago.
But to offset these gains is the fact that Communist China has hcen
strengthened, rather than weakened. by the Korean war.

This va:>t Asiatic power

seems to be more solidly under control of its totalitaria.n leadership than it was
three years ago, and certainly it has made amazing strides in the development
of modern milita1·y power - - particularly in the air {there are now 2, 500 to 3. 000
Ch~.ne3e

planes, furnished by Russia).

Thus the Chinese Red Army ' s weakr..esses
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in air power, antiaircraft, artillery, co nmunications, and mobility of suppl y
have been to a large extent (though not, of course , completely) remedied, and we
may be witnessing in the Orient a historic phenomenon of tremendous impo rtance
to our time -- the emergence of China from

feudali~m

into a modern stale.

There is another debit in the balance sheet, caused (but only partially)
by the frustration of Korea.

It is a lack of drive and a declining sense of urgency

-- a sometimes apathetic morale - - and the national frictions and differences
that weaken the anti-Communist coalition.
Where, then , do we go from here -- with crisis not ended but
compounded?
At this time a p r ecise answer is no t possible.

The first Eisenhower

defense and fo r e i gn aid budget was undoubtedly indicative of a t:rend to "stretch
out" and "cut ba c!<" , and yet to maintain a strong military posture.

But no firm

idea of where we are going -- o r how fast -- was possible until: (a) the fou r new
members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had "shaken down" in their duties and
functioned as a team; (b) a complete r eview of strategic plans and levels of armed
strength has been made by the new Chiefs of Staff; (c ) the Eisenhowe r defense
budget for the 1955 fiscal year has been p r epared; and (d) there is fu r ther development of the meaning of r ecent internal events in Russia and clari:icaticn of the
Communists• "peace" gestures .

In this connection , the Joint Chiefs have come

up with a "new l ook" which no one, as yet, fully understands except that it
increases air power, places majo r r eliance un the Strategic Air Command -- the
"massive r etaliatory power" aspect -- and
Army, Navy, and Marine Corps .

~educes

the present str ength of the
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There is, however, no doubt that Congress and much of the Republican
Party are in an economy mood; that the form of economic isolationism which
expresses itself in high tariff barriers and in sharp reductions in foreign aid is
gaining strength; and that, while air power still has a great poHtical and popular
appeal, many Congressmen believe there is much waste and "fat" in the defense
budg<:t.

TJt,less the world crisis sharpens, the armed services and especially

the foreign airl program are certainly in for a period of collar retrenchment.
The 1954 defense budget,

prep~red

by the T::-uman

Adm~nist::.'ation

but

hastily revised by Secretary of Defense Wilson and President Eisenhower,
sbcwed the trend clearly.

Expenditures during the next fiscal year will not be

greatly reduced because of prior contracts and a balance on the books of billions
of dollar s o f authorized funds which have not yet been obligated or spent.

However, a deep cut of more than $5 billion was applied to the Truman
armed forces appropriation request fo r fiscal 1954 and the Eisenhower budget for
1955. Such C:J.ts wi!l result in an actual reduction of existing operating units; it
will not cut, this year, into bone or muscle or sinew; but it will mean a reduction
in deliveries of aircraft and other items in future years.

Furthermore , it almost

ce!"tainly implies abandonment of the 143-group program of the Air Force .
The immediate results are that the services will be reduced
bo~h

t~is

year

in numbers of men in uniform and in numbers of civilian employees; that

some orders for new equipment will not be placed; and also that
orders will be either cancelied, cut

~ack,

or

str~tched

out .

som~

existing
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The long-term effects are more important.

The cut scer.1s to mean

that the expansion and growth of the a r med forces -- though not their m odernization -- is to be halted oelow present levels and under the "platc::.u of str ength' '
which had been the gcal of the T r aman Administr atbn .
The Truman expansion progt'am, hast:.ly invoked after the Korean war,
had as its goals an Army of 21 active divisions (plus 18 rcaimcntal combat teams,
etc.), a Navy of mo r e than l, 200 active ope ·ating vessels and some 15, 000
modern aircraft (including Ma rine

ail·c~aft),

a Marine Corps of 3 <!ivisions and

3 air wings, an<! an Ai:.- For-.e of 143 groups, most of them equipped with modern
postwar aircraft to a total of about 21, 00:) planes.

The target date for these goals

was originally mid -1 954 ; this was stretched out under President Truman to
1955 -56.
When President Eisenhowe r took office, the Army was shy only one of
its 21 divi!iions, though many of its units were incomplete; and the Navy was on
the whole in good shape , ti10ugh it badly neede<! new jets for its carriers and a
program of shipbuilding and ship conversion.

Thus the Army and Navy had almos

reac h ed the l evels of their numerical expansion , though their corresponding
modernization p r ogra m was but half completed.
The Air Fo rc e, however, had reached only 110 groups on its way to the
143-group

~;oal ,

although Sec r eta ry of Defense \\Tilson stated in Indianapolis, on

December 7, 1953 , that h e will ask Congress in fiscal year 1955 for funds to build
toward a 137- g•·oup Air Force by mid - 1956 o:.- 1957.
of

th~se

were fully ope rational, and thci'e was

obsolescent Wo rld War II type aircraft.

s~ill

M0reover, only about 85
a high percentage of
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In sum, the new t>-- 0 ~,. am scE>.-r.s to mean -- subject to the qualifying
factors previously mentioned -- tl=t the A-rmy will stabilize at a strer:gth of 18
divisions (many under strength}; the Kavy will

~e

reduced somewhat in size; and

the Air Force will stabilize at something like 137 groups.
Also, the new "plateau of strength" -- lowet' than the old - - will
probably be reached !insofar as complete modernization of the services is concerned} somewhat late r than the p:!:evious 1955 - 56 deadline.
The revised goals , plus the slowdo· ;n in the NATO prog:-:e.m, may
ult~mately

result in somewhat greater combat effectiveness of the active units

even though t!le total strength will be less.

On balance, the calculated military

risk has been somewhat increased, for there has been no change in 011r estimate
of Russian military capabilities save the obvious struggle for power now going on
in the Kremlin .

*******

**

>'.<

